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Introduction 
Stock   options   as   part   of   executive   compensation   have   increased 
dramatically over the last few years. One frequently mentioned reason for awarding 
stock options to managers (other than aligning managerial incentives with those of 
shareholders) is that options can be used as a device to retain valuable CEOs. 
Because options granted to CEOs have a typical three-or four-year vesting period, 
they can reduce voluntary executive turnover by increasing the cost to the CEO of 
leaving the firm. The monetary cost to the CEO of leaving a firm includes both the 
lost value of the unvested portion of stock options and the lost value of vested 
stock that may have increased over time. The last component represents the time 
value of unexercised options that accounts for the probability of increase in the 
share price. On the other side, the decision of awarding stock options belongs to 
the company’s board of directors. Their intentions regarding the manager of the 
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Abstract
This study examines the association between managerial turnover and equity-
based compensation. I investigate whether stock options act to bond executives to their 
firms and whether retention of managers is a motivation of companies in designing 
CEO incentive contracts. The results show that stock options do negatively influence 
the probability of a CEO leaving the company. The monetary cost of losing the value of 
equity-based compensation package keeps the manager with his company. I also find 
that in deciding upon a CEO's compensation scheme, firms take into account the 
probability of a CEO resigning from the company in the next period and award more 
stock options to reduce the threat of turnover. In general, the results show that stock 
options   have   an   important   role   in   managers'   retention   by   testing   economic 
explanations for observed behavior.firm are reflected in the way of compensating the CEO so that he will stay with the 
firm and take actions according to the shareholders’ interests. Executive retention 
is important to the firm because of the cost of replacing a valuable CEO. Therefore, 
the decision of awarding stock options reflects the possibility of potential turnover. 
In this study I look at the relationship between executive stock option 
compensation and anticipated turnover. The “anticipated turnover” term is used 
since a firm’s decision of awarding or not awarding stock options at time t is based 
on the probability that the CEO will leave the company in period  t+1. The 
hypothesis is that the adoption of option-based compensation increases as the 
probability of CEO’s turnover increases. To test this hypothesis, I examine all 
managerial departures in a sample of 7550 publicly traded firms between 1995 and 
2005. To analyze the relationship between stock option plans and turnover, I 
estimate a system of two equations, using an instrumental variable approach to 
estimate anticipated turnover and stock option compensation. The first equation is 
estimated as a negative binomial model (probit model) of voluntary executive 
turnover.   In   line   with   the   previous   literature,   the   results   show   a   negative 
relationship between executive turnover and unexercised options, time value of 
options and restricted stock. I also control for other determinants of turnover, such 
as ownership, firm’s size, firm’s performance, age, tenure and industry. In the 
second equation, stock option compensation is regressed on the predicted value of 
turnover from the first equation.   In this estimation, I control for various firm 
characteristics including volatility of the firm and industry, performance, size, age, 
cost of debt, and liquidity constraint. I find that the adoption of stock options is 
positively related to anticipated turnover.
The findings of this study are highly relevant for the current economic 
policy in the United States. To limit excessive corporate executive payment, the 
Obama administration is imposing a cap of $500 000 on total compensation of 
CEOs of companies receiving government assistance. The executives at these firms 
might be tempted to seek other positions at smaller firms that have not received 
government funds and are willing to pay more than $500,000 in salary for a 
valuable manager. In this perspective, we expect to see the executive turnover rate 
increase. However, the new rules do not include specific limits on the amount of 
stock options awarded. This so-called “loophole” in the bailout program may allow 
companies to increase the number of options awarded to keep their CEOs and 
avoid the turnover costs. While restricted on when they can be redeemed, stock 
options will be important instruments in managerial retention.
Literature Review
Because of the influential role played by the top corporate managers, there 
is a great deal of interest surrounding executive turnover. Much of the literature on 
the determinants of the top management turnover focuses on different aspects of 
management  changes in relation with firm’s  performance  and compensation 
contracts.  
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decline prior to the CEO turnover and improve thereafter. Coughlan and Schmidt 
(1985) also document that CEO turnover is seven times higher for firms in the 
lowest percentile compared with the highest percentile. Other studies focus on the 
problem of employee retention in firms that experience financial constraints. 
Gonzales and Gurtoviy (2006) develop a theoretical model of bargaining over 
deferred compensation. They find that the use of stock options as a retention device 
is valuable when firms try to avert bankruptcy. Overall, top management turnover 
rate   and   sensitivity  of   turnover   to   performance   and   incentives   significantly 
increased since 1930 (Hadlock and Lumer, 1997) and incentive compensation grew 
over the past half-century.
There is a smaller body of research on the effectiveness of incentive 
compensation on executive turnover, and the evidence of that research is mixed. 
Mehran and Yermack (1999), using 452 U.S. companies between 1984 and 1991, 
argued that the compensation policy plays a key role in retaining the top managers. 
The evidence presented by them shows that stock options, the most common type 
of stock-based pay, has a negative effect on the probability of turnover. Similarly, 
Balsam and Miharjo (2007) concluded that equity-based compensation, in terms of 
stock and options, can provide incentive for the manager to stay with the current 
employer.  Using a unique dataset supplied by a Fortune 100 company, Balsam et 
al. (2007) provided evidence that voluntary turnover is reduced during the period in 
which stock options cannot be exercised, the vesting period. In contrast to these 
results, Hasenhuttl and Harrison (2002) find no evidence that stock options 
negatively affect the likelihood of turnover. However, they restrict their sample 
only to the executives who take positions with other large corporations. Similarly, 
Fee and Hadlock (2003) find that options and restricted stock play an insignificant 
role for CEO’s retention. Yet, the data in their study covers only one year, 1995.
Data collection and construction of the sample
To   estimate   the   relationship   between   stock   options   and   managerial 
turnover, I study CEOs in a panel of 1314 U.S. industrial companies between 1995 
and   2005   using   executive   compensation   data   from   Standard   and   Poor’s 
ExecuComp database, stock price information from Industrial Compustat and news 
searches on Factiva, Lexis-Nexis and the Wall Street Journal.
My primary data source, ExecuComp, is a comprehensive data set that 
contains information about compensation, stock options, firm performance and 
other characteristics for the five highest paid executives and their companies. The 
Compustat database is one of the most extensive databases of financial data 
available. It provides monthly, quarterly and annual information for earnings, cash 
flow, ratios, balance sheets, income statements, and stock on over 10000 firms 
dating back to the 1950s. The information on CEO’s turnover was supplemented 
by news from Factiva, Lexis-Nexis and the Wall Street Journal, which contain 
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private companies, business and management topics and historical news.
I identify as potential turnover instances where the executive is listed in 
ExecuComp database in one year but he is absent in the following year. For these 
executive departures, more information about the reasons of leaving is taken from 
Factiva, Lexis-Nexis and Wall Street Journal databases. Initially 1086 instances 
were classified as potential turnovers. From these managerial departures, 192 
turnover events were dropped, since the executives were fired as suggested as 
reasons in the databases listed above. Sixty-four more turnover events were 
excluded from the sample due to the incomplete data on the firm’s volatility, cash 
liquidity and financial debt. The final sample  contains 7550 executive-year 
observations from 1995 to 2005, among which I identify 830 instances of executive 
turnover. The  definition of all variables  is given in Table 1.
The empirical model
In deciding the stock option offer in managerial compensation, firms 
consider the probability that the manager will resign and leave the company. 
Empirically, we can examine this motive by estimating the effect of anticipated 
executive turnover on the board’s decision to award stock options.
A manager considers the monetary cost when deciding whether to leave a 
job. The monetary cost of leaving includes the value of unexercisable options, both 
the intrinsic value and the time value and the value of restricted stock shares that 
will be forfeited if the CEO is leaving the company.  To estimate the value of 
restricted stock forfeited I use the fair value of those shares as provided by the 
ExecuComp   database   at   the   end   of   the   prior   year,   deflated   by   the   total 
compensation. I expect the value of restricted stock (RST) to be inversely related to 
turnover. With respect to the value of options that have not vested we should 
differentiate between the intrinsic value and the time value of stock options. The 
value of an option is composed of two components, intrinsic value and the time 
value. The intrinsic value represents the excess of the market price over the 
exercise price of an option at some point in time.  If leaving the firm, the CEO 
loses the intrinsic value of unexercisable options or, in other words, the value of 
the options held if these options were vested before his departure. I expect the 
intrinsic value at the end of the prior year deflated by the total compensation 
(UNEXERC_OPT) to negatively influence a manager’s decision to leave. The time 
value of an option (TIME_VALUE), depends upon the probability that the share 
price will increase prior to the time the option expires. Therefore, besides the loss 
the CEO suffers because of the impossibility of cashing his unvested options, he 
also forgoes the time value component of unexercisable options that could have 
increased his wealth. 
I investigate the relationship between stock option plans and turnover 
(TURNOV) in a system of two equations, using an instrumental variable approach 
with the anticipated turnover being estimated in the first stage. I estimate an 
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equation (OPTION_BI), representing the firms’ decision of awarding options to its 
CEO, is dichotomous.
The model is represented by the following two equations:
T URNOVt,t+1  = α1  + β1U NEX ERC_OP Tt + γ1T I M E _V ALUEt + 
δ1RSTt+θ1  OV  ERPAIDt  +  µ1OWNERSH  I  Pt  +  π1SIZEt  +  η1ROAt  + 
+υ1AGEt+ψ1AGESQt + ω1RETIREt + ξ1TENUREt + ς1 H I GH T ECHt + +ε1;
OPTION_BIt = α2  + β2 TURNOVt,t+1  + γ2VOLAt−1  + δ2VOLA_I N 
Dt−1+  θ2DEBTt−1    +  µ2CASHt−1  +  π2SI  ZEt−1  +  υ2AGEt−1  + 
+ ψ2AGESQt−1+ ω2MTBt−1 + χ2CHAIRt−1 + τ2POLICYt−1  + ε2;
Because turnover variable (TURNOVt,t+1)  is endogenous with the  firm’s 
options  decision (OPTION_BIt), it is estimated   in  the  first  equation  of the 
model. All of the independent variables in the first equation are identifying 
variables for the variable TURNOV. They influence the CEO’s decision of leaving 
but   not   firms’   decision   of   awarding   options.   Therefore,   the   relevance   and 
exogeneity criteria for considering them as instruments are met.
These are four main hypotheses for this model:
H1: Unexercisable options (UNEXERC_OPT) has a negative effect on 
probability of CEO predicted turnover (TURNOV), that is, β1  < 0. 
H2: Time value (TIME_VALUE) has a negative effect on CEO anticipated 
turnover (TURNOV), that is, γ1 < 0.
H3: Restricted stock (RST) has a negative impact on the CEO’s anticipated 
turnover (TURNOV), that is δ1 < 0.
H4:   Anticipated   turnover   (TURNOV)   has   a   positive   effect   on   the 
probability of having stock options as part of compensation package (OPTION BI), 
that is β2  > 0.   
In relation with executive turnover, I again control for other factors that 
influence the CEO’s decision.
The OVERPAID variable represents the amount the executive is overpaid 
or underpaid relative to his counterpart. The higher the manager is paid relative to 
his opportunity cost, the less likely he will quit his job. Therefore, I hypothesize 
that OVERPAID is negatively related to the turnover. This is in line with the 
prediction of Balsam and Miharjo’s (2007) model.
The OWNERSHIP variable represents the percentage of the firm’s equity 
that is held by the CEO. CEOs are less likely to lose their jobs if they own large 
amounts of stock. Therefore, I expect a negative relationship between a CEO’s 
stock   ownership   and   the   probability   of   turnover.     The   previous   literature 
documents a negative effect of the CEO’s stock ownership on turnover (Mehran 
and Yermack, 1999).
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Managers running larger firms may be more easily able to find alternative 
employment opportunities than managers at smaller firms. Supported by findings 
in previous studies (Fee and Hadlock, 2003), a positive relation is expected 
between firm size and turnover.
Return on assets (ROA) is a proxy for the firm’s performance. This 
measure is correlated with the CEO’s morale and satisfaction. Better performing 
firms have better future prospects and this motivates the manager to stay with the 
firm. Higher employee morale is likely to be associated with a lower turnover level 
(Balsam and Miharjo, 2007).
The AGE and AGESQ variables capture the effect of an executive’s age on 
the probability of turnover. I expect that, closer to the beginning and the end of 
their careers; managers are more likely to quit positions. AGESQ is included to 
represent any nonlinearity in the relationship between AGE and turnover. CEOs 
usually retire after age 63. To represent the impact of retirement on the likelihood 
of turnover, I use the variable RETIRE, a dummy variable with the value one if the 
manager’s age is over 63. I expect a positive relationship between RETIRE and the 
likelihood of turnover.
I also include in the model CEO tenure, as the executive may become more 
entrenched over time. I expect TENURE to be inversely related to turnover, as 
documented in the prior literature (Subramanian et al., 2007).
Finally,   HIGHTECH   indicates   if   the   company   operates   in   a   high-
technology industry. In line with prior studies (Henderson et al., 2006), I expect 
turnover to be greater for firms operating in dynamic industries.
With respect to the second equation, several other factors are controlled in 
relation with the decision of awarding options.  Volatility of the firm (VOLA) is 
expected to be positively related to the probability of compensating the manager 
with stock options. Firms that are more risk-intensive are more likely to award 
their CEOs with stock options in order to insure that the risk-averse managers 
undertake risky projects needed for the well being of the companies. 
Industry volatility (VOLA IND) has a positive effect on the likelihood of 
awarding stock options to the managers. When the operating environment is more 
volatile, firms do not want to insulate their managers from the market- wide 
conditions and therefore more stock options are used to compensate them.
Financial leverage (DEBT) influences the boards’ decision of awarding 
equity-based compensation. Firms with a higher cost of debt are less likely to 
award stock options to minimize the costs associated with them since the debt 
holders might ask for higher risk premium for continuing supplying the capital 
(Năstăsescu, 2009). Therefore, a negative relationship between the financial debt 
and the decision of awarding options is expected.
I also control for firm’s the liquidity constraint (CASH) that accounts for 
cash availability of the company. I expect a negative relation with stock options 
decision, implying that firms more constrained are less likely to award equity-
based compensation to their CEOs.
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because   the   managers   manage   more   assets.   The   need   for   more   incentive 
compensation leads larger firms to award more options to managers therefore SIZE 
should be positively related to stock options.
The age of the CEO (AGE) is expected to be positively related to stock 
option compensation. To control for nonlinearity in this relationship, AGESQ is 
also   included.   Previous   studies   use   similar   nonlinear   specifications   of   the 
relationship between age and stock options (Balsam and Miharjo, 2007) and find 
the CEOs are less likely to hold stock options when they are young and when they 
are close to retirement age.  This suggests a concave relationship between age and 
stock options.
Market-to-book   value   of   assets   (MTB)   represents   firm’s   investment 
opportunities and it is expected to have a positive effect on the decision of 
awarding stock options.  Firms with numerous investment opportunities are more 
likely to have asymmetric information problems.  Consequently, such firms rely on 
incentive compensation, such as stock options, to align the actions of managers 
with the interests of shareholders.
The CEO-chair duality allows for the possibility that the CEO is also the 
chair of the board.  Because the CEO’s interests are almost aligned with those of 
the shareholders, stock options play a less important role in the manager’s 
compensation scheme. However, if the CEO is also the chair, he may exert some 
influence over the board of directors to include stock options as part of his 
compensation.  The conflicting effects just described indicate that the net effect on 
stock option awards is not predicted by economic theory. Therefore, the sign of the 
coefficient for the variable CHAIR is ambiguous.
POLICY   is   a   dummy   variable   that   refers   to   the   recent   Financial 
Accounting Standard Board 123 rule regarding the accounting treatment of options. 
While the previous regulation, APB Opinion 25, did not require stock options to be 
recorded in the financial statement of the firm, the implementation of this new 
policy requires stock options to be treated as compensation cost. This new Security 
Exchange Commission regulation makes the award of stock options less attractive 
to firms. Therefore, I expect to observe a negative relationship between POLICY 
and the award of stock options.
Results
Table 2 presents the IV probit coefficient estimates of the CEO turnover 
model.  Because anticipated turnover is a determinant of stock option awards in the 
second equation of the system, the possibility of endogeneity between turnover and 
stock option awards arises. To check for the presence of endogeneity, I perform a 
test of exogeneity for probit analysis proposed by Smith and Blundell (1986). The 
null hypothesis of exogeneity is rejected at the 1% significance level, indicating 
that an instrumental variable procedure should be used to estimate both equation 
models.
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in-the-money options (UNEXERC_OPT) to be negative and significant at 5% 
significance level, showing that the value of the equity that a CEO must forfeit if 
he leaves the firm counts in his decision of quitting. The greater the value of the 
options that have not vested, the bigger the monetary loss he suffer, and the less 
likely the CEO are to resign. 
Regarding hypothesis H2, I find a negative relation (significant at 1% 
level) between the time value of the option portfolio (TIME_VALUE) and the 
likelihood of turnover. The negative coefficient on the time value component 
shows that the CEO is aware of the value that he might forego if he leaves the 
company and therefore, the greater this value is, the smaller the probability that he 
departs from the office.  
In hypothesis H3, I posit that restricted stock (RST) will be negatively 
related to turnover. This is supported by the negative sign for RST (significant at 
1% level) in Table 2.  
The variable that takes into account the CEO compensation relative to his 
opportunity cost (OVERPAID) has a negative effect on the probability of turnover 
although it is insignificant.  A CEO who is compensated more compared to other 
managers in the same industry has less incentive to leave the position. On the other 
side, a high CEO compensation reflects his value not only to the firm he leads but 
also to the other firms into the market looking for skilled managers to hire. 
Therefore, a highly paid executive has a high market value and consequently more 
opportunities to leave for another company that might offer a better compensation 
package.  These opposing influences may explain the insignificant effect of this 
variable on turnover.
As expected, the OWNERSHIP variable that reflects how entrenched the 
CEO is in the firm has a negative significant effect on the probability of turnover. 
The manager has a smaller incentive to leave the company the larger the portion of 
its equity he owns.  
The coefficient on firm size, measured as log of sales, is positive and 
significant at 1% level. This suggests that the executives of large firms are more 
highly desired in the labor market, perhaps because a high-level position in a big 
firm is a relatively more credible signal of managerial quality. Thus, these 
managers are able to find alternative employment more easily than executives 
running smaller firms. 
Firm performance, represented by return on assets (ROA), is expected to 
be inversely related to turnover because we expect that the better returns and better 
prospects of the firm should induce the manager to stay with the firm. Although 
this variable has a negative association with the CEO turnover, the coefficient 
estimate is not statistically significant.  
Three regressors capture the effects of the CEO’s age on the probability of 
turnover.  All of them are significant below 1% significance level and display the 
expected signs. The estimated coefficients of -.11 (SE=.03) on AGE and .001 
(SE=.0002)  on AGESQ imply that  the probability  of departure falls with age for 
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turnover and age suggests that the probability that the CEO resigns from the 
company is highest for the youngest and oldest executives.   For example, a 
younger executive, at the beginning of his career, may be more willing to forfeit 
the unvested equity compensation and jump to another company since he has more 
years   to   recover   the   amounts   lost.   At   the   opposite   pole,   older   executives 
approaching retirement are more likely to quit than the average executive.  For 
many CEOs, 63 is viewed as the “ normal ” retirement age and they are expected to 
step down from the position once they are around this age. This is captured by the 
variable RETIRE, which has a significant coefficient showing the positive relation 
between retirement age and CEO turnover.  
Consistent with the CEO entrenchment hypothesis, the coefficient on CEO 
tenure is negative and significant at 1% level. 
I find HIGHTECH to be positively and significantly related to turnover 
showing that executives are more likely to leave from more  volatile high-
technology firms.
The estimated signs and coefficients from the main equation of the system 
are consistent with the predictions from the theoretical model. The most important 
issue addressed in this paper is the positive effect of predicted turnover on the 
probability of receiving option awards, predicted in hypothesis H4. Regressing the 
binary variable OPTION_BI on the predicted value of turnover from the structural 
equation results in a positive coefficient with a statistical significance below 1%. 
This indicates that an increase in the probability that the CEO leaves the company 
in the next period will induce an increase in the probability of him receiving stock 
option in the year previous to his anticipated departure. 
The positive coefficient on the average industry volatility (VOLA IND), 
significant at 1% level, shows an interesting result regarding the CEO relative 
performance evaluation (RPE). An often-debated question among the researchers is 
whether executives’ payments should be measured on relative rather than absolute 
performance. That is, to the extent that some shocks affect all the firms in an 
industry regardless of the actions of individual executives, firms might find it 
profitable to filter this common shock out of their managers’ compensation. 
However, in most of the cases, because stock options or other equity-based 
compensation do not adjust for the industry-wide shocks, the market-wide effects 
are not filtered out. The result obtained here could be an explanation for this 
situation. It shows that, from a retention point of view, it might be better for the 
firms to reward the CEO for industry-level performance rather than firm-level 
performance. This is because, given that his opportunities are correlated with the 
industry, the CEO who is paid on the basis of relative performance is more likely 
to leave for another firm offering a more attractive compensation package. The 
positive coefficient on the industry volatility shown in this analysis shows that 
firms award more stock options in response to greater industry shocks and one 
reason is their interest in keeping their CEOs. Turning to the other determinants of 
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financial debt (DEBT) is negatively related to stock option awards.
With respect to the cash constraint variable (CASH), I find a negative 
although insignificant relationship to the probability of awarding options. The 
negative sign suggests that it is more likely for cash-constrained firms to offer 
stock options plans to their CEOs as a substitute for salary. However, we cannot 
prevent healthy financial firms from offering stock options to their executives. The 
inclusion of these less cash-constrained companies in the sample might explain the 
lack of significance for this relationship.
The firm’s size (SIZE) is positively related to the probability of having 
stock option plans. Larger firms have more complex operations and need managers 
with more experience. These managers, known for their managerial skills, have 
better outside opportunities. Therefore, the shareholders might find it cost-effective 
to award them with more options to avoid the costs of recruiting another manager 
if the current CEO decides to “jump ship.”
Market-to-book value of assets (MTB), a proxy for the firm’s investment 
opportunities, has the expected positive coefficient. This finding indicates that 
growth-firms use equity-based compensation to encourage managers to maximize 
shareholder value. Although the coefficient displays the expected sign, it is 
statistically insignificant.
Being the chair of the board also has an impact on the probability of 
receiving stock options. The variable CHAIR has a positive significant effect on 
the likelihood of having options as part of the CEO’s compensation. Although, 
according to the incentive alignment hypothesis, less options are needed to keep 
the shareholders’ and CEO’s interests aligned, it is also likely that, as chair of the 
board, the executive will exert sufficient influence to ensure that a significant part 
of his compensation is tied to the firm’s performance in an equity plan. These two 
opposite influences may explain the lack of significance of this variable on stock 
option awards.
The dichotomous variable POLICY reflects the two regimes, before and 
after the introduction of Security Exchange Commission policy 123R regarding the 
accounting treatment of the options. The coefficient on this variable is negative and 
significant   at   10%   level,   suggesting   that   the   implementation   of   the   policy 
discouraged firms from awarding stock options.
A significant positive coefficient on AGE and negative coefficient on 
AGESQ suggest that the probability of an option award is a concave function of 
age. Other things equal, the estimates imply that managers hold the lowest amount 
of options when they are young or beginning their career and also when they are 
approaching retirement age. Most importantly, the higher probability of an option 
award at mid-career (age 47) increases the probability of retention.
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Executive retention is an important issue in human resources management. 
This leads many companies to use compensation practices to provide incentives for 
the key managers to stay with their firms. Most often, due to their favorable 
characteristics, stock options contracts are used to fulfill this goal.
In this study I focus on the estimated or anticipated turnover prior to the 
decision of option compensation. I test whether the threat of managerial turnover 
faced by a firm affects its decision to award stock options held by its executive. I 
estimate an empirical model of executive turnover and test whether the predicted 
turnover is a factor in firms’ consideration of awarding stock options. In this 
model,   anticipated   turnover   is   endogenously   determined   in   that   the   CEOs 
previously consider the monetary cost of leaving the company. The likelihood of 
turnover is estimated in the first stage of the instrumental variable approach. The 
results show that the probability of turnover is smaller when the monetary loss is 
greater. An increase in the probability of turnover induces an increase in the 
probability of the executive receiving stock options in the year previous to his 
predicted turnover. Also, to retain the manager, the firm will award more stock as 
part of the CEO’s compensation package if the executive is more likely to leave the 
firm.
These findings have practical implications for companies and option plan 
designers. To provide their valuable CEOs sufficient incentive to stay with the 
firm, the companies offer their executives a significant portion of their wealth in 
stock options and restricted stock. However, the recent SFAS 123R policy 
regarding the accounting treatment of options will induce companies to look for 
ways of avoiding the expense of options in their income statements. Reducing the 
number of options awarded will decrease this cost but it also lowers the manager’s 
connection with the firm. Compensation consultants can use this information and 
propose extensions of the vesting periods of stock options or contracts’ length. 
Also, instead of awarding a single or few grants containing of a large number of 
underlying stocks, the firms could make more frequent grants of the same or fewer 
underlying stocks. This can insure that the CEO always has unvested options that 
would be forfeited if he decides to leave the company. Increasing the number of 
restricted stock shares could also be a way to help the companies with the retention 
of their executives at a lower cost.
If SFAS 123R policy prevents companies from awarding more options, the 
current events in the U.S. financial market may have an opposite effect. The 
ongoing financial crisis and recession have brought changes in executive pay in the 
United States. In the recent Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), managerial 
compensation is limited to an annual $500,000 for the most senior executives at the 
companies  that  receive  “exceptional  financial  recovery  assistance”  from the 
government.   However,  the  new rules  are  elusive  about  long-term incentive 
compensation. They do not cap the amount of stock options awarded, but restrict 
the time when stock incentives can be exercised. “If these executives receive any 
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until taxpayers are paid back for their assistance,” said President Barack Obama. 
With this drastic compensation cap, many executives from large TARP companies 
are now looking for other job opportunities. As reported by The Wall Street 
Journal
1, CEOs “are sending out resumes and making calls to smaller investment 
banks (often called ‘boutiques’ because of their smaller size) and European banks 
that haven’t taken government money, such as Credit Suisse Group AG and 
Deutsche Bank AG.” In another news article available on MSNBC.com
2, an 
executive mentions that “…managers at TARP companies will have incentives to 
move to their more healthy rival banks, or out to hedge funds or private equity 
where government restrictions are not an issue. Or, they may just stop working so 
hard.”
However, the turnover rate may not necessarily increase if the companies’ 
boards of directors decide to award the top executives with more stock options to 
compensate for the salary cut. This scenario is plausible because, according to the 
Conference Board’s Top Executive Compensation report for fiscal year 2007, 
99.9% of the CEOs total compensation was in stock and stock option holdings. On 
the other side, it is also possible that the managers will not be convinced to stay 
due to greater stock awards. In a slowing economy with weakening corporate 
performance, in most cases the companies’ stock values are significantly down and 
the CEOs are under pressure from the shareholders to improve performance. These 
realities together with the restrictions imposed by TARP on the exercising time of 
stock and options may make executives reluctant to stay with their current firms. 
The effects of the TARP policy on executive compensation schemes and the 
subsequent changes in managers’ actions present future issues for investigation.
Although the executive retention through stock options compensation plans 
still remains a subject for future research, the effect of these financial instruments 
on both the managers’ and the companies’ behavior is unquestionable and entirely 
deserving of their name as “golden handcuffs.”
Bibliography
1. Balsam S, Gifford R, Kim S, (2007) “The Effect of Stock Option  Grants on 
Voluntary Employee  Turnover”, Review  of Accounting and  Finance, 43:95-
119.
2. Balsam S, Miharjo S, (2007) “The  Effect  of Equity Compensation on 
Voluntary   Executive  Turnover”,  Journal   of  Accounting   and 
Economics, 43:95-119.
1  Moore H. For  Boutiques,  Time  to Shop as Bankers  Flee Big Firms [document on the internet]. 
The Wall  Street Journal, 2009 [cited 2009 Feb 10]. Available:  
h   ttp://online.wsj.com/article/SB123379537765150203.    h         tml.     
2   Byrnes  N,  Francis T, Executive  Pay:    Will  the  Big Bucks  Stop  Here?  [document on the 
internet]., 2009 [cited 2009 Feb 10].  Available:  h   ttp://www.ms    n   b         c.msn.com/id/29033921.    
           Volume 10, Issue 2, May  2009                    Review of International Comparative Management3. Coughlan A,  Schmidt R, (1985)  “Executive Compensation, Management 
Turnover, and Firm Performance: An  Empirical  Investigation”,  Journal  of 
Accounting and Economics,7(13):43-66.
4. Fee CE, Hadlock CJ,  Raids, (2003)  “Rewards, and Reputations  in  the 
Market  for  Managerial  Talent”, Review of Financial Studies,16  (4):1315-
1357.
5. Gonzales  LG,  Gurtoviy R, (2006)  How Much  to  Pay  in  Cash? Employee 
Retention   via   Stock   Options,   Max  Planck  Institute  for  Research  into 
Economic Systems,  Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction, 24:2-20.
6. Hadlock C, Lumer GB, (1997) “Compensation, Turnover, and Top Management 
Incentives: Historical Evidence”, The Journal of Business70 (2):153-187.
7. Hasenhuttl  M,   Harrison   JR,  (2002)  Exit  or  Loyalty:   The  Effects  of 
Compensation on  CEO  Turnover,  Working  Paper, University  of  Texas, 
Dallas.
8. Henderson  A, Miller D, Starks L, (2006) “How Quickly Do CEOs Become 
Obsolete? Industry Dynamism,  CEO  Tenure and  Company  Performance”, 
Strategic  Management Journal, 27:447-460.
9. Huson M, Malatesta P, Parrino R, (2004) “Managerial  Succession and Firm 
Performance”, Journal  of Financial  Economics, 74:237-275.
10. Mehran   H,  Yermack   D,   (1999)  Compensation  and  Top  Management 
Turnover. Working  Paper, Kellog Graduate School of Management, 2-35
11. Nastasescu R.G, (2009)  “The Role of Equity-Based Plans” in Managerial 
Compensation   Schemes:   An   Investigation   of   CEOs   Risky   Investment 
Decisions and Executive Turnover, PhD [Dissertation]. Northern Illinois 
University, Dekalb.
12. Smith RJ, Blundell R.W, (1986)  “An  Exogeneity  Test for  a  Simultaneous 
Equation  Tobit   Model  with  an  Application  to  Labor  Supply”, 
Econometrica, 54(4):679-686.
13. Subramanian N, Chakraborty A, Sheikh S, (2007) “Repricing and Executive 
Turnover”, The  Financial  Review, 42:121-141.
Review of International Comparative Management                      Volume 10, Issue 2, May  2009Description of the  variables
Table  1
Variable               Description
UNEXERC OPT  Intrinsic value of unexercisable of option  divided  by total 
compensation
TIME VALUE  Time  value  of  stock  option  divided  by  total 
compensation
RST  Restricted stock fair value divided by total compensation
OVERPAID  Total cash compensation received  by the executive minus 
the average earned by an executive in the same year and 
two digit SIC code; this is divided by total compensation
OWNERSHIP  Percentage of  firm’s  equity  held  by  the  CEO SIZE 
Log (total sales)
ROA  Return on assets
AGE  CEO’s age
AGESQ  Square  of CEO’s age
RETIRE Dummy  for  retirement  age;  equals  1  if  CEO’s  age  is 
greater than 63
TENURE  CEO  tenure-time since the  CEO  held the  position
HIGHTECH  Dummy  for  high-technology  industry; equals  1  if  the 
firm operates  under two-digit SIC  codes 35, 36, 38, 48 
or 73
TURNOV  Dummy  for  turnover; equals  1  if  a  CEO  holds  his 
position  in year t but resigns in year t+1
VOLA  Monthly  firm stock volatility
VOLA IND  Standard  deviation of the  monthly average  return in  the 
same two-digit
SIC code industry
DEBT  Agency cost  of debt, computed as ratio of book value  of 
long-term  debt divided by the  market value of equity
CASH  Liquidity constraint,  computed as  net cash  flow divided 
by  the market value of the  firm
MTB  Market-to-book ratio
CHAIR  Dummy for CEO-CHAIR duality; equals  1 if the CEO is 
also chair  of the  board
POLICY  Dummy  for Policy  123R; equals  1 if it  is implemented 
(for year 2005)
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Table  2
Predicted  sign Coefficient Standard 
error p-value
Dependent variable:   TURNOV
Instruments
U N EX ERC OP Tt - -0.0044 0.0019 0.026**
T I M E  V ALU Et - -0.0047 0.0019 0.012***
RSTt - -0.0429 0.0128 0.001***
OV ERP AI Dt - -0.0129 0.0114 0.2590
OW N ERSH I Pt - -0.0369 0.0045 0.000***
SI Z Et + 0.0211 0.0134 0.116*
ROAt - -0.0005 0.0006 0.4180
AGEt - -0.1254 0.0303 0.000***
AGESQt + 0.0014 0.0003 0.000***
RET I REt + 0.2618 0.0676 0.000***
T EN U REt - -0.0092 0.0025 0.000***
H I GH T EC Ht + 0.0995 0.0409 0.015**
I N T ERC EP T 0.8285 0.9026 0.3590
Dependent variable:   OPTION BI
Independent variables
T U RN OVt,t+1 (predicted) + 1.164 0.0603 0.000***
V OLAt−1 + -0.254 0.1792 0.1560
V OLA I N Dt−1 + 0.8353 0.7757 0.000***
DEBTt−1 - -0.0272 0.0105 0.009***
C ASHt−1 - -0.0735 0.0529 0.1650
SI Z Et−1 + 0.0501 0.0105 0.000***
AGEt−1 + 0.1700 0.0221 0.000***
AGESQt−1 - -0.0017 0.0001 0.000***
M T Bt−1 + 0.0002 0.0006 0.7150
C H AI Rt−1 +/- 0.0502 0.0285 0.079*
P OLI C Yt−1 - -0.1273 0.0684 0.063*
I N T ERC EP T -4.0943 0.6314 0.000***
Number  of observations: 7550
Log likelihood -5939
Model  significance :
Wald  χ2  (d.f.) 527 (21)
p-value 0.000
Smith-Blundell test  of exogeneity :
χ2  (d.f.) 27.37 (1)
p-value 0.000
***Significant at  the  0.01 level
**Significant at  the  0.05 level
*Significant at  the  0.1 level
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